I. To all the Questions Together

170. To solve these questions I put first a certain example, namely about how bodies are made to rest in diverse ways [cf. Prol. nn.170-178]. For the ultimate terminus of rest for heavy bodies is the center. But to this center, as to the ultimate terminus, a heavy body adheres per se and first, for example earth, which does not by the nature of some other body adhere to that by which it participates in heaviness and in the adhering in question.

171. Now a body adheres to the center immovably and per se, but not first, because it adheres by the heaviness and the adhering that it has received from earth. However it does adhere per se, because it adheres by an intrinsic form and firmly and immovably, because it does so as it were through what is intrinsic to earth, which is what rests first, as stones and metals in the bosom of the earth; and such things, although they do not rest first, do yet perfectly rest, because they are perfectly conjoined to the center through the medium of the first rester, with which they are, as it were, perfectly united.

172. In a third way, a body adheres to the center through the medium of the earth with which it is united, but movably and not firmly, as a heavy object existing on the surface of the earth; and such a thing, although it truly rests for a time, is yet not as determined in rest as a body that is resting in the second way.

173. In a fourth way, a body can adhere uniformly to a body next to it and rest with respect to it, and not rest with respect to the universe if the body next to it, to which it adheres, is not uniformly adhering to the center, for example in the case of a man lying on a ship; although it would be in the power of a body to be itself at rest, that heavy body, which would be finally at rest itself in some such movable thing but not in the center, whether mediately or immediately, would be disorderedly at rest, because although, as far as depends on itself, it would be at rest because of its firm adhesion to such a movable body, yet it would not adhere to that to which it should, according to its own nature, adhere in order to be at rest.

174. Applying the example to the intended proposition, the will corresponds in spiritual things to weight in the body, because “as the body by weight, so the spirit by love is borne wherever it is borne,” according to Augustine On the City of God 11 ch.28. The center which of its own nature gives ultimate rest is the ultimate end; hence the wise man says that “God is the intellectual sphere, whose center is everywhere and whose circumference is nowhere” [Ps.-Hermes Trismegistus Book of 24 Philosophers prop.2] -it accords with truth. To this center the divine will first and per se immovably and necessarily adheres,Interpolation: “Hence the Commentator Physics II com.88 says that the disposition of a simply necessary being is that it not exist because of its action but its action because of it, and this mode is found in simply eternal things.” ⁴⁴ because not by participation in anything other than itself, for this will, not by habit nor by a deferring act nor in virtue of any superior cause, most perfectly and necessarily loves the supreme good.

175. In second rank is a blessed created will, which not first, but by participating in God, yet per se, because by its own intrinsic form, adheres firmly to this good, and that because it is made to be as it were intrinsic to the will that is first at rest, because it always abides in that will’s good pleasure.

176. In third rank is the will of a just wayfarer, who although it relies on the divine will and relies, by its mediation, on the supreme good in which the will itself rests, yet it does not firmly and immovably adhere to the good pleasure of that very will; hence now it adheres to that good and now it turns away from that good. - But here there is a certain unlikeness to the third member in the case of bodies [n.172]; because there the body is able not to be at rest while the form remains by which it rests, but here the form, by which the will rests, is posited to be destroyed at the same time along with aversion of the will from the center.

177. In the fourth rank is the mortal sinner, who although, as far as depends on the act of the will that is making itself rest, adheres vehemently to something other than God, so that neither by its mediation nor immediately is it adhering to God, yet on the part of the object it cannot be simply at rest; nay rather, just as someone at rest with respect to a ship, and not with respect to the center, is not simply at rest, because not at rest with respect to what in the universe makes ultimately to rest, so the will, which is making itself rest, as far as it can, in some object other than God, is not simply at rest, because not at rest with respect to what in the universe makes the will ultimately and most perfectly to rest. The fact is also plain, because the will is there never satisfied, however firmly it immerses itself in the thing by loving it for its own sake.

178. On the basis of these points I say to the questions posed that to enjoy either means delight or it means the act of adhering to the object for its own sake, to which act the rest of delight is concomitant, or which act is itself the delight or the rest, that is, the act that ultimately terminates the power to the extent that a power terminates itself in its act; so that about the idea of enjoyment, if it means the act, it does not seem to be the case that it itself makes the power to rest as far as depends on the part of the object, but as far as depends on the part of the power adhering to some object for its own sake; so that the divine will enjoys simply and necessarily and per se and first; but the blessed created will enjoys simply and perpetually and per se but not first; the just will of the wayfarer enjoys simply and per se but not immovably nor first. The will of the mortal sinner enjoys simply because, as far as depends on the part of the will, it would make itself to rest, and does rest, in the object which it loves for its own sake; but it does not simply rest as far as depends on the part of the object, nor does that object require enjoyment, but because the object does not make it to rest as a power makes itself, by its act, to rest in its act, therefore its enjoyment is disordered.

179. But in that case there is a doubt as to what object the mortal sinner enjoys, namely whether his own act or the object of his act.

My reply: I say that in general he enjoys himself, because he loves the object of his act with the love of concupiscence. Because all love of concupiscence is preceded by an act of love, and consequently he loves something else with the love of friendship, and that something else is himself, for whom, as loved with love of friendship, he loves the object with love of concupiscence. He does not then enjoy the object of his act, nor consequently the act itself, on which there is no need that he first reflect back. This opinion is that of Augustine On the City of God 14 ch.28: “The two loves have made two cities: the love of oneself to contempt of God has made the city of the devil, the love of God to contempt of oneself the city of God,” and On Genesis to the Letter 11 ch.15 n.20. Therefore the first root is in this, that the sinner enjoys himself.

180. To the penultimate question [n.166] it can be said that although the sensitive appetite in some way adheres to something for its own sake, that is, not because of another negatively, because it does not have the feature of referring to another, nor yet by contrariety, because the object is not valued as not referable to another; therefore it is said in an abusive sense to enjoy, because of lack of relation, but not properly, because it does not adhere in a non-referring way. Likewise neither does it adhere with love, because it does not properly have the feature of loving. Likewise neither does it properly adhere, because it does not apply itself to the object but is as it were fixed by the force of the object, because it does not lead but is led, according to Damascene On the Orthodox Faith 2 ch.22. And by following the said simile about the resting of bodies [n.173], one could say that the sensitive appetite is likened to iron that is fixed to adamant by the force of the attracting adamant, and thus is made to rest in the center neither mediately nor immediately, nor in anything else, by the force which would give it rest in the center, or by any intrinsic force making it rest in something as if in the center, but only by force of something extrinsic making it rest. So here, the force of the object makes it to rest, but not the intrinsic force of making to rest in the center or as if in the center, which force as freedom alone, and this does not belong to the sensitive appetite.

181. To the final question [n.168] the answer is clear from what has been said. Because, if enjoying proper by sensitive appetite be denied, which appetite however more agrees with the will, where enjoyment is, than natural appetite agrees with it, because the act of the sensitive appetite follows an act of knowing just as does the act of the will - not thus, however, the act of natural appetite, if it has any act - then the conclusion follows that enjoying proper does not belong to what has natural appetite alone, nay nor does it thus belong abusively either in the way it belongs to sensitive appetite.